http://new-middle-east.blogspot.com/2012/01/following-op-ed-article-published-in.html
http://new-middle-east.blogspot.com/2012/01/many-moving-parts-of-iraqs-current.html

This past summer, quite expectedly, I found myself becoming obsessed with genealogy.  At a time when I had no lack of other things to do, I spent hours scouring the internet in search of crumbs of information about long deceased ancestors.   Family history, to be sure, was not a new interest.  In fact, I am convinced that it is one of the reasons why I became a historian.  It all goes back to a distant winter afternoon — I was probably about 11 years old — when my brother and I, rummaging through a trunk in the attic came upon a pile of papers bound in twine with the words “Family Genealogy” written on the front.  We brought it out into the light, gingerly opened the brown manila cover and started poring through pages filled with the sloping cursive of a man educated in the 1880s—our great-grandfather.  Much of what was written, references to eugenics and reflections on theology, went above our heads, but we were enthralled by the heroic exploits of our great-great grandfather in the Civil War and intrigued by long lists of names sprawling down page after page.  And on the last page, written in later in a shakier hand a name appeared that we recognized instantly—our own father, born two years before the author of the manuscript passed away.

                Eventually a photo album surfaced with an assortment of faded sepia-tone prints—a weary old farmer and his wife, a frightened boy in a Civil War uniform, a seated middle aged man with beady eyes, a pointed beard and a gaunt wife standing at his side.  Pondering these faces, and the names attached to them from the family genealogy, I wanted to know more.   If I could only find some kind of independent confirmation, records of some sort that showed these people had an existence outside the brittle pages of my great –grandfather’s memoir.  I knew records were available, but somehow the prospect of spending hour upon hour in libraries pouring through censuses and tax records to find a few names, seemed both daunting and indulgent.  By the time I had access to such libraries, I was already on my way to becoming a professional historian, making my way through graduate school, delving into historiography and critical theory, mastering a difficult foreign language and preparing to produce a dissertation.  History, for me, was about engaging the big questions, unearthing neglected sources, crafting narratives and advancing the historiography, not chasing after lost relatives.

                Then the internet made its appearance.  After the first powerful search engines came into use, I would occasionally type in names of ancestors drawn from my great grandfather’s genealogy, which by this time I had digitized and stored as a pdf file.    But the results were generally disappointing—one or two fleeting references and a mass of dead ends.  I put the idea aside and went on to other things.  This past summer, however, contemplating a family vacation through the Finger Lakes Region where my ancestors had lived, I typed some names into Google and was astonished by the results.   The amount of material available had increased exponentially—US Census data, vital records, local histories, published genealogies, cemetery listings and more.    Quickly, I found a wealth of references to ancestors, confirming and expanding upon information in the family genealogy.   I was even able to find a distant relative, a fourth cousin, who had also been drawn into genealogical research and had posted extensive information on the internet.   While I had limited myself to sources freely available, my relative had signed up for various commercial genealogical sites and had actually gone so far as to have his DNA tested.   My appetite whetted by these discoveries, I threw myself into further research, only to emerge frustrated.   Having harvested the low hanging fruit, the quest for additional information involved more and more effort with less and less reward.   Eventually, my enthusiasm for family history waned, other obligations imposed themselves, and I put off the search for another time. 

                My encounter with genealogy, fleeting as it was, spurred me to think about the relationship between the pursuit of family history and more traditional forms of historical research and writing.  To the extent that genealogy involves an investigation into the past, it would be hard to deny its connection to the historical profession.   But to my knowledge, professional historians have largely stood on the sidelines as interest in genealogy has expanded exponentially over the past decade.  A recent study has shown that in a single month, December 2010, over 17.5 million unique users visited the 10 most popular genealogy sites.   87% of American surveyed in a recent opinion poll said they would be interested in learning more about their ancestors. [1]  Genealogical research has become a multimillion dollar industry.  Clearly there is an enormous reserve of potential interest in learning about the past among genealogy buffs, and historians might do well to think about how better to reach this audience. 

                `Yet, for all the overlap between genealogy and history, there is much about the practice of genealogy that historians may find unsettling.   Genealogy fosters a kind of historical tunnel vision.   Genealogists delve deeply into the past for very limited fragments of information—dates of birth and death, marriage records, places of residence—often with little or no consideration of the broader historical context.   The types of questions historians like to ask about processes of change over time rarely play into genealogical research, and the historian’s penchant for narrative and argument, stories interwoven with explanation, is largely absent from genealogy. Indeed, the end product of genealogical research, more often than not, is some rendition of the classic family tree—a bare listing of names and dates with little space to characterize the lives of the individuals referenced.   The fact that these listings are often produced using templates created by commercial enterprises that provide access to sources only widens the gap.   Perhaps it’s best to say that genealogy is history halfway, capturing the excitement and obsession of the research process, but stopping short of the analytical synthesis that arises when historians weave their data into narratives.

                But halfway history is far better than no history at all.  Genealogy has the potential to act as a gateway toward a more holistic understanding of the past.   History is often dismissed as arcane and irrelevant, but what could be more relevant than one’s own past?   Even something as basic as remembering dates can be improved by genealogy.  After all, we remember dates not through some feat of abstract memorization, but rather by the associations that they evoke.  Family history can provide a chronological matrix that can hold in place a broader historical awareness.   Perhaps it is unlikely that the average adult genealogist, left to his or her own devices, will look up from the tables and charts and start to pose broader historical questions.   In the classroom, however, all sorts of possibilities come to mind.   As I found out years ago with my great-grandfather’s manuscript, Genealogy has the potential to engage young people in history by drawing them into the past, arousing their interest and creating a sense of a personal connection.    A skilled teacher could then channel this raw interest into historical research, pushing students to explore the backdrop against which their family history played out.   Such an engagement could turn out to be the first step toward a lifetime of appreciation for history.            

                No doubt, I am not the first to think along these lines.   I am curious, therefore, how teachers have used genealogy in the classroom.   What sorts of techniques and strategies have been employed?  What kinds of pitfalls have been encountered?   Has the exercise led to the expected results?  Given the explosion of interest in genealogy in recent years and the wealth of available tools, the use of genealogy as a tool for teaching history deserves further discussion and consideration. 

NathanielKnight
SetonHallUniversity

            One easily overlooked resource that teachers might find highly useful inUnited Stateshistory or government classes is the classic television show. By that, I mean the dramas, comedies, and documentaries of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. These are readily available on the Internet; they can be converted and downloaded to your computer by using the free site, www.zamzar.com.

            The Twilight Zone series is a rich source of episodes or film clips for those teaching about the Cold War and McCarthyism. For example, “The Shelter” (1961, Episode 68) depicts the emotional devastation that results in a close-knit neighborhood as a family has to decide whether it is going to share its fallout shelter with their desperate (and shelterless) neighbors. “The Monsters are Due onMaple Street” (1960, Episode 89)  shows the results of mindless fear and hysteria on a peaceful suburban neighborhood.  Episode 74, “Deathshead Revisited,” deals with the return of a sadistic SS captain toDachau concentration camp; it aired in November 1961, a month before an Israeli court sentenced Adolph Eichmann to death for his role in the “Final Solution.”  

            One would not necessarily think of the old series Gilligan’s Island when teaching John Locke’s social contract theory. However, a clip of any episode of the series can be used as a hook when introducing this content. After introducing the definition of the social contract as Locke saw it, the students can debate whether or not a social contract existed on the island and if so, whether this unwritten agreement was necessary for the group’s survival. One could make a good case that it did!  (As one examines the social contract theory set forth in Leviathan, a clip of a series that today’s teenagers are more familiar with, Survivor, could provide a good illustration of how Thomas Hobbes viewed human nature!)

            When discussing American society after World War II, the famous sitcoms of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s can be quite useful.  A clip of I Love Lucy can provide an insight into what was expected of women in the 1950s. (Lucy’s ridiculous attempts to start a career in entertainment were always doomed to failure, as her husband Ricky insisted that she stay home and fulfill the role of the housewife and mother.)  Leave it to Beaver shows the ideal of the American family in the 1950s; it would be interesting to contrast a brief clip with oral history interviews of people who experienced family life during this period.  

            An interesting show of the late 1960s and early 1970s was Room 222, which gives a glimpse of the changing attitudes toward racial and ethnic minorities through the eyes of students and teachers at Walt Whitman High School. (Contrast a clip of this show with one of Leave it to Beaver‘s all-white, middle class view of family and school to show the evolution of attitudes from the 1950s to the 1970s.)

            The Andy Griffith Show, still quite a popular series in reruns, also offers a few gems. The best is the “Preamble Episode,” in which Deputy Barney Fife attempts to recite the Preamble to the United States Constitution. This very funny three-minute clip is available on TeacherTube and is a great icebreaker when covering the document, especially if you are planning to have the students recite it.

            On a more serious note, the acclaimed CBS news program See It Now provides a fascinating window into the events of the 1950s. The Museum of Broadcast Communication (http://www.museum.tv/) has a great archival selection of television documentaries, including clips from Edward R. Murrow’s See It Now telecasts from Korean War battlefields. Interestingly, one of the best episodes of MASH, “A Room inKorea” (1976), was inspired by Murrow’s coverage of the war. (See http://www.tvland.com/video-clips/mash/a-room-in-korea)

            Last but not least, The Ed Sullivan Show (see www.com) offers  the Beatles’ first U.S. television appearance (1964); The Milton Berle Show showcased Elvis Presley (1955) before he appeared on the Sullivan show (see http://www.elvispresleymusic.com.au/pictures/1956_june_5.html#HoundDog)

            Once you have decided which clips to use, what to do  with them? The possibilities abound.  When paired with a couple of thought-provoking questions or a short article, they make wonderful hooks to introduce new content. They make great writing prompts as well as starting points for debates or discussions. Instead of doing the legwork yourself, challenge your high school students to find clips for you. (Be sure to state your expectations on appropriateness and review their finds; clips found on YouTube can be altered in unexpected and sometimes startling ways. When covering the cultural history of the postwar era, the addition of  television clips can be an effective  way to demonstrate the power of the medium to reflect and even shape the American way of life.

Footnotes or endnotes appear in all history books, especially monographs.  Some students comment that they are distracting because those little numbers clutter the text.  Of course the notations are not meant to clutter and they serve several functions.  Footnotes can be used to clarify, define, or argue a point more thoroughly than is appropriate for the text.  As a professor of mine once said, “Grind your axes in the footnotes, not the text.”  Footnotes can be used to give the reader alternative views to those being expressed in the text.  They can also offer suggested sources that may expand upon a point in the text.  However, the primary purpose of the notation number is to lead the reader to a citation that will provide them the exact location for the source material used for documenting the passage of text.

This means then that the author must take great care in making notations so that the citation will take the reader to the correct source location.  Accuracy is vital:  the author, title, edition, and page number(s) are all signposts that guide the reader so that they don’t get lost on the research highway.  Once the reader gets there they must decide whether or not the author has fairly used or interpreted the source.  This is another matter altogether.

Practical exercise in verifying the use of sources:

Have you ever followed footnote citations to verify their accuracy and whether or not the author used the sources fairly?  I had done this when grading student research papers as a matter of routine, but had never given the practice much thought when reading a monograph.  Many years ago I received a request to review a book for a historical journal.  When the book arrived I was pleased with the magnificent dust jacket art but once I began reading the work…well let’s just say that old adage came to mind: “you can’t judge a book by its cover.”  I will not furnish the citation for that book.  It is not my purpose to belittle the author or the editor.  I will say it was a history of the Osage Indians and the book provided numerous examples on how NOT to “do history.”

So let’s take a passage from the book and explore the citations within it.  At this point in the book the author is attempting to give some sense of the increasing value ofSpain’s trade among the tribes that held territory along theMissouri River.  The Osage were a formidable group and success in trading depended upon their goodwill:

     ²⁷Abraham P. Nasatir, Borderland in Retreat (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1976), pp. 18-19;  also Lawrence Kinnaird, ed., “Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794,” Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1945, Pt. 1, Vol. II: 214-218.

     ²⁸ Ibid., p. 228.

     ²⁹ Loc. cit.

In this example, footnote 27 is important even though this number is not given in the passage provided.  For students who may not be familiar with the Latin used in this older citation style, footnote 28 says “Ibid” which means “in the same place” and was commonly used to reference the same source noted in the previous footnote.  “Loc. cit.” in number 29 means “in the place cited exactly” and was used to specify that the citation was in the exact location (source and page number) as the previous citation.  The obvious question for footnote 28 is which source is the author referencing, Nasatir or Kinnaird?  A quick check reveals that Nasatir’s book is only 175 pages so the “Ibid” in footnote 28 can’t refer to that work.  Therefore, all of the information referenced for footnotes 28 and 29 should all be derived from a single page:  228 of “Spain in theMississippiValley, 1765-1794.”  That page is included as a Word document at the end of this essay. 

Note that the document is a translation of the report “Nations of theMissouri” from Pedro Piernas, the lieutenant governor of Upper Louisiana, to Luis Unzaga, governor ofLouisiana.

Now, with the book passage and the original source cited we can begin our exercise.  The author states that the Spanish investment in theMissouritrade totaled 97,000 livres.  The source specifies “97,400.” Next the author states that the value of the livre should be twenty cents.  No authority whatsoever is cited for the exchange value.  Even if we indulge the author and accept the value, the “math doesn’t work.”  97,000 X .20 equals $19,400 not the $19,480 written by the author.  However, if you multiply .20 times the correct number in the source, the sum is $19,480!

Even more troubling is what comes next.  The author asserts that profits usually ranged from 100% to 200% and once again, no authority is cited.  He then arbitrarily selects 100% as the margin he will use to calculate the value of profit to be expected from the Missouri Riverarea and Osage trade.  He arrives at the dollar value of $1,948,000.  It is clear the author multiplied the investment amount times 100 rather than 1.00 (which is proper expression of 100%)!!!  This mistake is compounded when he derives the value of the Osage trade by taking just under one half (45.58%) of the dollar amount and giving $888,000 as the value of their trade.  The only accurate figure in the author’s calculations is his assertion that the Osage trade accounted for roughly one half of the total Missouri Rivertrade.  Note on the source document that the Little Osages and Great Osages (the two divisions of the Osage tribe) had 22,200  pounds worth of goods of a grand total of 48,7000.  This means the Osage portion was 45.58% of the total trade.  Incidentally, you will also note in the source document that “forbidden” is written beside both Little Osages and Great Osages.  This means that trade was legally forbidden (and had been since 1773) because the Spanish were “punishing” the Osage for depredations.  The Spanish hoped to gain more compliant behavior from the Osage by depriving them of trade goods.  In reality, the trade ban was being lifted so Piernas is reporting the anticipated level of trade based on what was being authorized for the upcoming trade season, not how much trade was actually taking place.

Next the author leaps ahead to the 1794-1795 trading season and tells the reader he will apply the same basis for calculating.  What really happens is that he makes the same math mistakes again.  In addition, his citation declares that the data for 1794-95 came from the same page in the source as the previous citation.  It clearly did not.  The volume cited ends with the year 1781 so the base numbers must have come from a different volume. 

The last statement from the excerpted passage requires the reader to make yet another leap of faith with the author.  We are told quite plainly, “No figures are available for theArkansastrade, but the Osage portion…would be at least half.”  There is not the slightest clue as to how the author arrived at such an assertion.

In conclusion, writers must take great care in documenting their work.  The sources must be properly cited and the sources must be fairly / accurately used.  If we are true to our discipline, we will judge books not by their covers, but by their content.

http://new-middle-east.blogspot.com/2011/12/crisis-in-iraq.html

By Eric Davis

Eric Davis (davis@polisci.rutgers.edu) is professor of political science at Rutgers University and former director of Rutgers’ Center for Middle Eastern Studies. He is the author of

Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq

(University of California Press, 2005) and the forthcoming 

Taking Democracy Seriously in Iraq  (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

The end of 2011 will mark a watershed in U.S.-Iraqi relations. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that the United Statesand Iraq signed in December 2008 calls for all American forces to leave Iraq by December 31, 2011. While it is still unclear

whether U.S. troops will remain in Iraq beyond this year, there is little doubt that U.S.-Iraqi relations will undergo significant

change. What will that change look like? Will it mean a substantial decline in U.S. influence in Iraq? In light of Iraq’s strategic

importance both in the Middle East, and to U.S. regional interests, as well as the importance of its continued efforts at

democratization, what form should U.S. policy take after the drawdown of U.S. troops?

U.S. policy in post-SOFA Iraq will need to focus on five main areas of mutual interest to both countries, all of which are

interrelated. Their focal points include: security, governance and institution building, democracy promotion, economic growth

and development, and regional, bi-lateral relations. As a proviso, the United States will need to be sensitive to the legacy of

tensions that developed with Iraq following the 2003 invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein’s Ba

c

thist regime. An effective

U.S. foreign policy will require treading softly as it pursues its national interests in Iraq.

SECURITY

Both Iraq and the United States share a strong interest in improving the country’s security situation. The inability of U.S. and

Iraqi forces to control the country’s national territory after the U.S. invasion in 2003 was a major cause for the sectarian

violence that engulfed the country between late 2003 and early 2008. While Iraqi security forces have made great progress in

containing terrorist groups, terrorist related violence has recently increased as U.S. and British forces have withdrawn from

many areas of the country. The wide scale attacks that occurred throughout Iraq during the month of Ramadan in August

2011 offer a stark reminder that Iraqi security forces are still not in control of country’s territory.

As U.S. forces have been leaving Iraq, Iran has been rearming Shiite militias in southern Iraq. This activity continues a

strategy that Iran has pursued since the U.S. invasion. Its goal has been to pressure the United States as much as possible by

increasing casualties among U.S. forces. Iran seeks to send a message that Iraq will only enjoy stability if Iranian interests in

Iraq and the region are accommodated.

Foreign meddling in Iraq’s domestic affairs underscores the fact that Iraq’s stability is as much a function of corrosive

“neighborhood effects” as it is a function of the capabilities of its security forces. At least three of its neighbors—Iran, Syria

and Saudi Arabia—are deeply disturbed by the image of a resurgent Iraq with the potential to reestablish itself as a major

regional power, given its extensive untapped reserves of oil and natural gas. Iraq’s emerging democracy offers a model for its

own citizens that all of Iraq’s neighbors find threatening. For Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states, a nation-state where the

Shi

ca dominate the political landscape provides a model for their own restive Shic

a communities, who seek greater political,

social, and economic freedoms. Due to the threat they perceive, none of these countries is willing to try to help Iraq achieve

stability.

Security concerns represent an area where U.S. and Iraqi interests will converge for the foreseeable future. Iraq needs to

develop its armed forces to prevent armed Shiite militias in the south from reasserting their power. In addition, Iraq must

contain a weakened al Qaeda and its surrogates, such as the Islamic State of Iraq. It must also prevent these organizations

from reestablishing themselves in the Sunni Arab heartland of north central Iraq. U.S. forces provide Iraq with invaluable

logistical support and Iraqi commanders want access to U.S. counterterrorism expertise. That many American law

enforcement agents are working in Iraq with five-year contracts demonstrates Iraq’s desire to have the United States play a

central role in helping it institutionalize its security needs.

Foreign Policy Research Institute

E-Notes

Iraq needs to develop an air force if it is to have any military credibility, as well as the capacity to monitor and control its

lengthy borders with Syria and Iran. The impunity with which Iranian forces have been able to attack opposition PJAK

(Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan) guerillas in Iraqi Kurdistan is just one example of Iraq’s need for air power. Here the

United States will be crucial in providing Iraq with state-of-the-art aircraft, command and control technology and, of course,

pilot and maintenance training. While Iraq has a short coast along the Persian Gulf, its waters south of the Shatt al-

c

Arab, at

the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers are critical to its ability to export oil, as well as to receive goods at its main

ports of Basra and Umm Qasr. Iraq will also need the United States to help it develop a modern navy. As a number of Iraqi

leaders have admitted, their country possesses neither the capacity to control its airspace nor its waters in the Persian Gulf.

Because the Iraqi government realizes that the United States offers the best military equipment and training available, and

given the ties that have already developed between Iraqi and American officers, undoubtedly the Iraqi government and higher

echelons of the armed forces want to maintain a close military relationship with the United States.

Although Prime Minister al Maliki, a majority of the political elite, as well as the military command, want a U.S. military

presence to be maintained beyond December 2011, matters are not that simple. The future of the U.S.-Iraqi security

relationship is closely tied to Iraq’s domestic politics. The leadership of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which

comprises the three majority Kurdish population provinces in the north east, is alarmed at the developing military ties

between the United States and the central government in Baghdad. For the Kurds, a resurgent and powerful Iraqi army

recalls the efforts of a number of Iraq’s Arab leaders to subordinate the Kurds. This was especially true of Saddam Hussein

whose notorious “Anfal Campaign,” between 1986 and 1989, killed hundreds of thousands of Kurds and destroyed over 175

Kurdish villages, devastating the Kurds’ agrarian sector in the process.

For its part, the Iraqi government is concerned that the Kurds are keen to keep a U.S. military presence in the KRG—even a

military base. Iraq’s Arab leadership views the KRG’s efforts to maintain close ties with the United States as a strategy

designed to strengthen its regional autonomy and control local oil reserves at the expense of the central government. While the

Kurds view U.S. troops as providing insurance against another attack by the Iraqi army on the KRG, the central government

considers close U.S.-KRG ties to be threatening Iraq’s sovereignty and national integration. The Iraqi government sees these

ties enhancing the KRG’s ability to declare independence from Iraq should it decide to do so. Of course, the underlying issue is

the lack of trust between the Arab and Kurdish wings of Iraq’s political elite.

Not all security issues divide the al Maliki government and the KRG, however. One security-related issue that has created a set

of mutual interests among the central government, the KRG, and the United States is preventing the unresolved issue of the

“disputed areas” from turning into a military conflict. These areas include the oil rich and ethnically divided city of Kirkuk,

which the Kurds insist should be part of the KRG, and the border—the so-called Green Line—that divides Arabs and Kurds

in the Ninawa plains. U.S. forces have played a critical role in mediating tensions in both Kirkuk and other disputed areas in

the north. The joint U.S.-Arab-Kurdish patrols that the U.S. created have had a salutary impact on reducing possible flare-ups

between troops of the Iraqi army and the Kurdish Pesh Merga militia. With U.S. forces completely removed from the volatile

north, violence could easily break out between the two forces, which neither the central government nor the KRG desires.

Thus, it is in the interest of both the Iraqi government and the KRG to have some U.S. troop presence in the north.

However, all these issues are moot because, at present, the Iraqi government has still not indicated whether any U.S. troops

will be allowed to stay in Iraq. As Iraqi President Jalal Talabani noted, any revision of the SOFA would require a vote of the

parliament and would need to be supported by 2/3 of the delegates.

1

In his view, such an outcome is unlikely before the December 31, 2011 deadline for the U.S. forces to withdraw. In reality, the

parliament is not the real impediment to preventing an agreement allowing U.S. forces to remain beyond 2011. If al Maliki

and his State of Law Coalition, the Kurds, and the al Iraqiya Coalition decide that U.S. forces should remain beyond

December 2011, a positive decision would be forthcoming in parliament.

Nevertheless, al Maliki must protect himself from ongoing attacks by populist forces that insist that all U.S. forces leave Iraq

by the end of this year. The most vociferous opposition to U.S. forces remaining in Iraq comes from Muqtada al Sadr, the

leader of the once powerful Mahdi Army (

Jaysh al Mahdi).2 The Sadrist bloc in parliament (known as the al Ahrar

) has played

an anti-American nationalist card, to the extent of introducing a resolution in parliament that would ban the current U.S.

Ambassador, James Jeffrey, from entering and addressing the body.

3

1

Al-Hayat

, July 21, 2011

2

For an analysis of the Mahdi Army, see my, “Sectarianism, Historical Memory and the Discourse of Othering: The Mahdi Army,

Mafia, Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta,” in Chris Toensing and Mimi Kirk, eds.,

Uncovering Iraq: Trajectories of Disintegration and

Transformation

(Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 2011), pp. 67-113.

3

Al-Hayat

, July 5, 2011.

Although the Sadrist opposition has aroused nationalist sentiments—especially among the downtrodden sectors of Iraq’s

Shi

c

a—the Sadrists, with only 39 seats in parliament, do not have the power to constrain government behavior. Clearly, Iran is

the main player in influencing Nuri al Maliki’s government and is using the Sadrists as one of its proxies to undermine the

U.S. presence in Iraq. Because Iran not only has influence among the Sadrists, but within the al Maliki government as well, it

has become difficult for al Maliki to convince all cabinet members and the political elite to support keeping on U.S. troops,

even if only in a training capacity. As long as some political forces continue to play the anti-American card, al Maliki remains

vulnerable to the criticism that he is not protecting Iraq’s national sovereignty.

However, tensions have emerged between the Sadrists and the Iranian government, particularly over Muqtada al Sadr’s call

for the Iranians to turn over the former Mahdi Army commander, Isma

cil al Lami, the notorious “Abu Dirac

a (“the invincible

one,” also known as the Shiite Zarqawi).

4

A highly feared commander, who was responsible for the deaths of many Sunni

Arabs in Baghdad at the height of the sectarian violence in 2006, al Lami had been living in Qom. He now leads an offshoot of

the Mahdi Army, the League of the Righteous (

Asa’ib al Haqq

), which is located in Sadr (Revolution) City, in northeastern

Baghdad. According to Arabic press reports, al Lami returned to Iraq in 2010 and became a threat to Muqtada al Sadr’s

leadership. Al Sadr is angry with the Iranian government for giving support to al Lami, including military training by

Revolutionary Guard units.

5

If these tensions persist, the Sadrists may be less willing to do Iran’s bidding in Iraq.

If al Maliki is to take Iraq’s security needs seriously, he will need to restructure his political coalition. If he agrees to allow U.S.

troops to remain in Iraq after 2011, he will certainly lose the support of the Sadrists and face opposition from pro-Iranian

elements within his own government. However, if he were willing to compromise with Ayad Allawi and his al Iraqiya Coalition

which would require his agreeing to cede powers to the new National Council for Strategic Affairs and filling the portfolios of

minister of defense and interior with appointees agreeable to al Iraqiya, his coalition would rest on a much firmer basis. If he

likewise made a greater effort to reach out to the Kurds, he would be able to withstand attacks by pro-Iranian political forces.

A coalition of members of his State of Law Coalition, al Iraqiya Coalition, and the National Kurdish Alliance would provide

the parliamentary basis for moving ahead to insure Iraq’s security needs.

GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS

Modern Iraq has never enjoyed the benefits of well developed political institutions. The Hashemite monarchy that the British

imposed in 1921 was viewed as illegitimate by many Iraqis. While a parliament was established and regular elections began to

be held in the 1920s, they were manipulated by the monarchical elite. Consequently, the Iraqi parliament never gained

legitimacy either. The army was the only institution that developed after the 1930s, staging the Arab world’s first military

coup d’état in 1936 and ruling the country between 1937 and 1941. After the army overthrew the monarchy in July 1958,

personalistic and dictatorial rule became the norm.

6

General

cAbd al Karim Qasim, who ruled Iraq from 1958 until being overthrown by a Bac

thist putsch in 1963, banned

political parties and refused to allow elections. The new Ba

cthist leader, Ali Sac

di al Salih, who ruled briefly from February

until November, 1963, was a brutal ruler who was responsible for massive repression and the destruction of much of Iraq’s

civil society. While less repressive, Colonel

cAbd al Salam cArif, who ruled from 1963-1965, and his brother, c

Abd al Rahman

c

Arif, who ruled from 1965 to 1967, continued the tradition of dictatorial rule.

When the second Ba

c

thist regime came to power in 1968 under Ahmad Hasan al Bakr and Saddam Hussein, all remaining

institutions of civil society were systematically destroyed. Consequently, Iraq became a one-party state. Repression was the

norm and an estimated three million Iraqis perished during 35 years of Ba

c

thist rule. While Saddam created a parliament in

1980 after seizing the presidency from al Bakr in 1979, this parliament possessed no independent authority.

7

Given this legacy

of dictatorial rule, it is remarkable that Iraq has, since 2003, been able to hold free and fair elections, develop new institutions

of civil society, and establish a functioning parliament.

Nevertheless, as the political impasse following the March 2010 parliamentary elections demonstrates, one of Iraq’s crucial

needs is to develop functioning political institutions, especially at the executive level of prime minister and cabinet officers.

Although technically a parliamentary system, Iraq’s polity is still controlled by a small elite, centered around Prime Minister

4

Abu Dira‘a literally means, “owner or possessor of the shield,” which implies that no one can penetrate his armor and thus he is

invincible. Abu Dira’a, who brutalized many victims along Haifa Street in Baghdad, is also referred to as the “Shiite Butcher” for

torturing his victims with electric drills before killing them.

5

“Iraq’s Sadr Says Iran Will Not Hand Over Militant,” Agence France Presse

, August 10, 2011. For the possible outbreak of violence

between the Sadrists and the League of the Righteous, see, “Mahdi Army vs. League of Righteous: Fears That Fresh Violence

Between Shiites Could Spread,

Niqash

, July 14, 2011, http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=75&id=2864&lang=0

6

For a discussion of Iraq’s early political development, see my

Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern

Iraq

(Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 55-81.

7

Having visited polling stations during the June 1980 parliament elections while conducting research in Iraq, it was clear to me that

only candidates hand-picked by the Ba

c

th Party were allowed to stand for office.

Nuri al Maliki. In reality, the parliament exercises limited control over the prime minister and his cabinet. In many ways, his

government continues the personalistic style that characterized monarchical rule under the Hashemite and the strong men

who ruled after its overthrow in 1958.

While the Iraqi parliament (Council of Deputies) deserves more credit for its accomplishments to date—such as its efforts to

control corruption within government ministries—the office of the prime minister and his cabinet officers can claim few civic

accomplishments. Ministries are distributed according to a political calculus that is determined by the power of individual

political parties, not the candidates’ qualifications. Ministers are not accountable to voters nor the Iraqi prime minister, but

rather to the small cliques who control their respective political parties.

In addition, Iraq’s judiciary represents a core component of the nation’s political institutional framework. The judiciary has a

long historical pedigree, dating back to the early twentieth century. The Baghdad College of Law was founded in 1908. In the

1940s and early 1950s, a sophisticated legal code was established under the tutelage of the renowned Egyptian jurist,

c

Abd al

Razzaq al Sanhuri. Even under the Ba

c

thist rule, some civil and criminal cases were known to have been adjudicated beyond

political influence.

However, since 2003, Iraq’s judicial system has faced numerous obstacles in establishing itself as an independent institution—

deciding cases on their merits rather than according to political considerations. In March 2010, after the al Iraqiya Coalition

won 91 seats to al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition’s 89, the prime minister was angered that the judiciary did not support his

claim that the results were invalid. Instead, Iraq’s high court ruled that the elections had been fair and the results valid.

8

Since the March 2010 elections, al Maliki has worked to circumscribe the power of the judiciary and the Iraqi Independent

High Electoral Commission (IHEC), which also validated the election results. Judges face pressure to vote according to the

prime minister’s wishes. Al Maliki has also sought to place Iraq’s Central Bank under his control and has established security

services that report directly to him. He has also resisted efforts by the parliament to extend jurisdiction over the cabinet

officials at the highest levels—minister and general director—who are currently immune from prosecution for corruption. Al

Maliki has told judges how he wants them to vote. In short, the independence of much of the federal judiciary has been

seriously undermined under his administration, belying the title of his political party, the State of Law Coalition.

Prime Minister al Maliki claims that Iraq is a democracy and that his government functions according to the rule of law.

Neither the United States nor any other country should dictate what form Iraq’s political institutions should take. However,

the United States and many other foreign countries provide significant assistance to Iraq. This assistance requires a

constitutional and democratic framework if it is to be used in an effective manner to assist the population for which it is

intended. Further, a global consensus has developed—especially since the collapse of communism—that all nation-states

should adhere to internationally accepted norms of democratic governance and the rule of law. U.S. efforts to promote the

capacity of Iraqi political institutions should not be seen as an intrusion into Iraq’s domestic affairs. Rather they must be

viewed as efforts designed to assist the Iraqi government in meeting the demands of its citizenry and implementing the very

standards of governance which it says it seeks to achieve.

Without improvements in the quality of political institutions, the extensive government corruption that currently exists in Iraq

will persist and the provision of services will continue to decline. Pervasive corruption and lack of government services have

evoked serious hostility and cynicism from large segments of the Iraqi populace, thereby threatening to undermine Iraq’s

effort at a democratic transition.

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Ever since the Iraq invasion, U.S. efforts at Middle East democracy promotion have assumed a negative connotation.

9

Rather

than making a rapid transition to democracy after 2003, Iraq developed a major insurgency and widespread sectarian

violence. The Bush administration initially was unsuccessful in its efforts to promote democracy in Iraq, in large part due to

cultural insensitivity to local notions of democracy. Nevertheless, Iraq has made significant progress towards democratization

since Saddam Hussein’s regime was overthrown. The seminal question that needs to be asked is how can the U.S. support the

continuation of this process? How can U.S. involvement avoid creating the impression that it seeks to dictate how Iraq should

promote democratization?

Rather than assuming that it possesses all the answers to Iraq’s attempt to implement a democratic transition, the United

States should devote more effort to eliciting views from Iraq’s democracy activists, both within and outside the government, as

to what the country needs to support democratization. Based on public opinion polling to date, such questioning would

indicate that two-thirds of Iraqis support democracy, and seek greater transparency in government decision making,

8

For al Maliki’s efforts to use kingship ties to influence the decisions of the IHEC, see: “A Family Tie Too Tight: Nepotism Runs

Deep in Iraq Politics,”

Niqash

, July 21, 2011, http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=75&id=2868&lang=0

9

Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion,” Foreign Affairs

, Mar. – Apr., 2006, pp. 55–68.

eliminating corruption, and improving the quality of services provided by the state.

10

One important consideration in helping Iraq implement a transition to democracy is improving the system of checks and

balances. This requires building more effective political institutions. Training for judges and parliamentarians, as well as civic

training for security forces, constitute ways in which the international community can assist Iraq in strengthening political

institutions. The model developed by the United States Institute of Peace’s Rule of Law program that has provided many Iraqi

judges with up-to-date knowledge of developments in the legal field—access to which was unavailable under Saddam

Hussein’s regime and especially during the UN sanctions—provides an excellent model of providing assistance to Iraqis in

their efforts to reconstitute civil society.

11

Another way to enhance the system of checks and balances is to provide support for the print and visual media—newspapers,

journals and television programs—that can provide information needed to prevent government officials from taking

advantage of their positions. A large number of Iraqi journalists, television commentators, and producers have been killed by

sectarian and pro-authoritarian political forces,

12

precisely for their persistent efforts to root out corruption and nepotism in

government circles and to force ministries to provide better services to the Iraqi population.

Support for civil society is another area where the United States and other countries and international agencies can help

promote democratization in Iraq. The dual legacies of Saddam Hussein’s regime’s destruction of civil society, and the UN

sanctions imposed on Iraq between 1991 and 2003, have created serious impediments to Iraq’s ability to reestablish a

functioning civil society. While the concept of civil society was well established prior to the onset of Ba

c

thist rule in 1963 and

then again in 1968, many Iraqis, especially young people, are unfamiliar with the idea that citizens have the right to organize

themselves to promote their collective interests—independent of the state.

13

Developing civil society is key to Iraq’s process of national reconciliation. Saddam Hussein spent years following a “divide and

conquer” policy of setting one ethnic group against another, especially during the UN sanctions period between 1991 and 2003.

Now, civil society organizations’ work, devoted to conflict resolution and national reconciliation (such as the Iraqi Peace

Network) is essential to moving Iraq forward in an area which the al Maliki government and the current political elite have

largely neglected.

As my research with Iraqi youth has made clear, young people reject sectarianism which they see as destructive to their

futures and to Iraqi society generally.

14

With 70 percent of the population under the age of 30, it is critical that organizations

exist that can give hope that a new political culture—one more open, tolerant and pluralistic—can emerge in the future.

Because so many of Iraq’s civil society organizations are populated by Iraqi youth, the institutional development of Iraq’s civil

society provides an important channel through which they can express their aspirations for the future. It also provides an

important training ground for young people who may seek to enter politics.

15

Women’s rights groups, professional associations—especially those of journalists, jurists, and students—youth groups, and

conflict resolution groups are just some of the civil society organizations that require ongoing foreign financial support.

Training organizers and members of civil society organizations, whether in Iraq or outside the country, constitutes another

crucial need.

The United States can have a salutary impact on Iraq by expanding educational opportunities for Iraqis in the United States.

When I first conducted research in Iraq in May and June of 1980, I was surprised by the number of Iraqis who demonstrated

positive attitudes towards the United States. The reason soon became apparent: these were Iraqis who had studied at

American universities. Even a number of Ba

c

thist officials with whom I spoke, after the perfunctory critique of U.S. foreign

policy in the Middle East, would smile recalling their study in the United States.

10

See the National Democratic Institute (NDI) poll, Iraq’s Democracy at the Tipping Point

, November 23, 2010; and the

ABC/BBC/NHK poll,

Iraq – Where Things Stand

, March 16, 2009. The poll’s results were summed up as: “Dramatic advances sweep

Iraq, boosting support for democracy.”

11

For the details of this program, see,

12

As of September 9, 2011, 340 journalists have been killed, see, http://www.brussellstribunal.org/Journalists.htm

13

For a discussion of the development of civil society in Iraq, see my, The Historical Genesis of the Public Sphere in Iraq, 1900-1963:

Implications for Building Democracy in the Post-Ba‘thist Era, in Seteney Shami, Publics, Politics and Participation: Locating the

Public Sphere in the Middle East and North Africa (NY: Social Science Research Council Books, 2010), pp. 385-427.

14

This research, in which I conducted focus groups with 600 Iraqi youth, will be published in preliminary form in a forthcoming

Special Report,

Iraqi Youth between Optimism and Cynicism

, to be published by the U.S. Institute of Peace.

15

Admittedly, I am referring largely to educated and middle class youth. Poor Iraqi youth continue to bear the brunt of unemployment,

lack of education and exposure to violence and displacement. In the larger study that builds upon the focus groups, I focus more on the

“other Iraq,” namely the underprivileged and disadvantaged sectors of Iraqi youth.

America should consider offering far more scholarships to Iraqis for studying in the United States, as well as encouraging

private universities to do so. With the world’s best university system, the United States can offer better professional and

technical training than most countries in the world. Equally importantly, the country’s open society invariably fosters respect

among foreign students for American traditions of fairness, political freedom, and expressing contrarian views. These

scholarships would represent a small cost in the larger scheme of U.S. expenditures in Iraq. Educating Iraqi students at

American universities would benefit the professional classes in Iraq and, ultimately, have a positive impact on civil society, as

well.

If the United States were to suggest the convening of several international conferences that included Iraq, the European Union,

Turkey, and other countries and NGOs committed to democracy in the Middle East, the Iraqi government and civil society

organizations could use such a platform to develop a “democratization agenda.” With a well-defined plan for implementing a

democratic transition securely in place, both the Iraqi government and those outside Iraq, who are concerned with this

process, could better define and identify what types of support are needed.

Creating a “democratization agenda” could serve to temper the behavior of political leaders who seek to deviate from the

democratic transition process. If a subsequent government tried to abrogate the process, it would have to answer to the Iraqi

parliament, the judiciary, and the citizenry at large. Criticism would also come from foreign countries and NGOs, who are

committed to providing resources to assist Iraq in its democratic transition. Clearly, encouraging Iraq to better define the

democratic transition process would benefit the Iraqi people, as well as contributing to greater stability in the Middle East.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

It cannot be stated strongly enough that Iraq’s efforts to implement and consolidate a democratic transition will come to

naught if the country does not experience economic growth and development. Unemployment and underemployment are

widespread, especially among Iraqi youth. The lack of jobs has created great resentment because many Iraqis question why a

country as rich in oil and natural gas is not able to provide for the material well-being of its citizens. That many Iraqis are

unable to secure durable employment only adds to the public anger at high government salaries and widespread corruption.

The power and influence of criminal organizations and sectarian militias is directly correlated with the lack of jobs. In the oilrich

city of Kirkuk, for example, many physicians have closed their clinics and left the city for the more secure Kurdish

provinces to the north because they have increasingly been subject to kidnapping.

16

Clearly, Iraq’s security is inextricably

linked to economic conditions. If the government fails to more actively create employment opportunities, we can expect the

continued expansion of criminal activity in response.

With the focus on Iraq’s hydrocarbon wealth, the agrarian sector is often neglected when considering economic growth.

Successive Iraqi governments have paid little attention to agriculture. Combined with a protracted drought that has plagued

the country for over two years, many peasants have left their farms and migrated to urban areas. This is especially true of

younger peasants. With few jobs available in Iraq’s cities, especially since migrants possess little education and few skills, they

are ripe for recruitment to criminal organizations and sectarian militias.

This continued decline of the agrarian sector and the central government’s inability to improve rural conditions constitute a

major threat to Iraq’s security. It is one of the main reasons why sectarian militias have been able to generate support in

southern Iraq. Here is an area where the United States can provide important technical expertise. While water shortages will

remain a serious problem for the foreseeable future, better water management could have a positive impact on Iraqi

agriculture. Right now, there is almost no national conservation program in place.

17

The United States could also have an important impact on Iraq’s budding private sector. Studies have indicated that Iraqis

are among the most entrepreneurial people in the Middle East.

18

While the government bureaucracy is not particularly

favorable to the creation of new industries, many businessmen have nevertheless built successful enterprises, ranging from

cellular telephone service to construction. One of the most successful business organizations has been the Iraqi American

Chamber of Commerce and Industry which, through a large membership and sponsorship of economic development projects,

16

Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, “Abductions Target Kirkuk Doctors,” Rudlow, May 7, 2011,

http://www.rudaw.net/english/news/iraq/3797.html

17

For a discussion of this issue, see my, “Iraq’s Water Crisis Threatens its Economic and Political Development,” December 14, 2011;

http://new-middle-east.blogspot.com/2010/12/iraqs-water-crisis-threatens-its.html

18

See the Gallup Poll, Arab Youth Express Strong Entrepreneurial Spirit

, June 9, 2009, in which Iraqi youth expressed very high

levels of commitment to entrepreneurship: http://www.sbdc-iraq.com/files/128100279569_doc101488_RFA_FD801-2010-

002_webfnl-1.pdf; For the problems faced by Iraqi entrepreneurs, see: Sameeksha Desai, “Entrepreneurship in Iraq: Understanding the

Constraints,” http://www.ony.unu.edu/middayforum/UNU.%20Background%20Readings%20on%20IRAQ.pdf

has had a valuable impact on Iraq’s economy.

19

The continued development of the Iraqi hydrocarbon sector will provide economic opportunities for foreign firms specializing

in exploration, technical services, and human resource training. A robust expansion of the oil and natural gas industries will

continue to attract ever larger foreign investment in Iraq. Here American corporations can make an important difference in

providing Iraq with state-of-the-art technology.

Despite the wealth generated by the sale of oil and natural gas in the world market, many hydrocarbon rich countries are said

to suffer from the so-called “oil curse.”

20

This condition occurs when countries become excessively dependent on resources,

such as oil, for the majority of their revenues. This is the case in Iraq which derives 95 percent of its current revenues from

exporting oil. It will need to diversify its economy. The fact that the state controls oil production means that reliance on oil has

potentially negative political consequences, as well. Centralizing wealth in the central government can lead to authoritarian

rule because it largely removes the state’s need to depend on the populace at large for revenues.

21

One of the remedies for the “oil curse” is economic diversification. The United States, European Union, and international

assistance agencies would do well to provide Iraq with the resources to promote private sector enterprise.

22

In light of the

entrepreneurial nature of the Iraqi people, the development needs of the agrarian sector, including improving the delivery of

water resources, and the inability of the central government and KRG to deliver necessary social services, the private sector

can fill a large vacuum by helping to improve the lives of Iraq’s citizenry.

BI-LATERAL RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF ‘NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS’

Iraq’s most important bi-lateral relationship—beyond the United States—is with Iran. As Iran has continued to pursue its

nuclear weapons program, its economy has suffered from the impact of international sanctions imposed on it. Iraq has become

important to Iran in several ways. First, it provides Iran with an outlet from the relative isolation that it increasingly

experiences in the international community. Having the ability to sell a wide variety of commodities to Iraq, and to benefit

from oil smuggled into the country, helps Iran offset some of the negative economic consequences of international sanctions.

Iran’s increasing economic presence in Iraq carries with it more political influence. The United States can do little to offset

this influence. Nevertheless, it can seek to channel Iranian economic influence in Iraq into developing Iraq’s private sector. As

Iran significantly increases its economic influence in Iraq, this may reduce its meddling in Iraqi politics. Economics ties could

become the priority if only because of Iran’s concerns about its own shaky economy.

Turkey has played an increasingly positive role in Iraq—especially in the KRG where it has large investments.

23

Turkish

investments in the KRG (estimated to be well in excess of $6 billion) have tempered the Turkish government’s response to

attacks by the outlawed PKK (Kurdish Workers Party), which often uses Iraqi territory as a base of operations against

Turkish forces in south eastern Turkey. Realizing that it can serve its national security interests more effectively through

encouraging economic integration with Iraq, Turkey has pursued a very constructive foreign policy that stands in sharp relief

to that of Iran.

Particularly important will be the ties that develop between Turkey and Iraq as a result of the development of Iraqi natural

gas resources, especially in the Ukaz field in al Anbar Province along the Syrian-Jordanian borders. Iraqi gas is expected to

feed in to the proposed Nabucco pipeline connecting Central Asia and Iraq with Europe.

24

This will increase Iraq’s strategic

importance because it will provide a counterweight to Russian efforts to manipulate natural gas supplies to Europe for its

national interests.

The United States should continue to undertake all it can to enlist Turkey’s help in developing closer ties with Iraq. As

mentioned above, economic growth that generates additional employment is among the most important ingredients in bringing

political stability to Iraq, thereby enhancing the possibility of an effective transition to democracy.

19

The Iraqi-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry can be accessed at: www.i-acci.org/

20

This term should no doubt be revised to reflect that fact that many oil-producing countries are also rich in natural gas resource, such

as Iraq.

21

For an analysis of “rentierism” (excessive dependence on oil wealth for state revenues), see Bassam Yousif and Eric Davis, “Iraq:

Understanding Autocracy – Oil and Conflict in Historical and Socio-Political Context,” in Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir Makdisi, eds.,

Democracy in the Arab World: Explaining the Deficit

(London and New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 227-253.

22

For efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development to promote small business in Iraq, see the discussion of the

Tijara

Project at: http://iraq.usaid.gov/node/34.

23

“Turkish Investors Favour Iraq as Unrest Sweeps Region,” Reuters

, March 30, 2011,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/30/iraq-turkey-investment-idUSLDE72T28120110330

24

“Iraq Looks Beyond Nabucco Gas Pipeline,” UPI

, April 7, 2011, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-

Resources/2011/04/07/Iraq-looks-beyond-Nabucco-gas-pipeline/UPI-89351302178500/

Syria’s relationship to Iraq has been very ambiguous. On the one hand, it has given shelter to members of the deposed Ba

c

th

Party. It has also allowed insurgents to cross its border with Iraq to carry out terrorist attacks. In other contexts, Syria has

cooperated with the Iraqi government to police the border. It has accepted many Iraqi refugees, who have fled to its cities to

escape sectarian violence. This refugee influx has been especially true of Iraq’s Christian community, which is more

concentrated in the northwest of Iraq near Syria.

25

With the current unrest spreading throughout the country, and the Ba

c

thist regime of Bashar al Asad diverting all its

attention to controlling the uprising, it appears that Syria will be unable to interfere in Iraq’s internal affairs. Indeed, it has

sought to obtain Iraqi oil given the disruption of its own economy and declining oil production. Its economic vulnerability

provides an incentive not to attempt to destabilize Iraq. Still, Syria maintains close ties with Iran, which may try to use such

ties to further destabilize Iraq. However, Syria’s ties with Iran may become more tenuous as Bashar al Asad’s regime faces

ever more widespread protest.

The United States must be wary of Syria’s alliance with Iran. However, it is unlikely that Syria will loom as large as it did

during the sectarian violence of 2003-2008 given the challenges that the Ba

c

thist regime will continue to face. If, on the other

hand, the current Syrian regime is forced to make concessions and meet the demands for greater freedoms by the ongoing

uprising, then it is possible that a new and more positive relationship may develop between Iraq and Syria. Equally plausible

is the possibility that Syria may continue to devolve into chaos. In that case, remnants of al Qaeda and the Islamic State of

Iraq may be able use it as a base of operations and cross the Iraqi-Syrian border with impunity.

The final set of bi-lateral relations impacting Iraq’s security involves its relationship with Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf

states. The main concern of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states is Iran’s expanding influence in Iraq. They view with alarm the

close ties that have developed between the al Maliki government and the Islamic Republic. An Iraq that is militarily resurgent

and allied with Iran represents a frightening scenario from a Saudi and Arab Gulf perspective.

Given its own restive Shiite population, which resides in the oil-rich northeastern al Hasa (al-Ahsa’) and Qatif areas, Saudi

Arabia, in particular, is very concerned that Iraq has developed a political system that has resulted in significant political

power for the country’s majority Shiite population. Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states find Iraq’s open electoral process

to be threatening. This is true not only because it suggests the need for political reforms that would offer greater political

participation to Saudi Arabia’s Sunni citizenry, but because it encourages its Shi’a, which constitute a large segment of the

Arab Gulf’s population as well, to also seek greater political and social freedoms.

The United States can play a constructive role here. America should continue to encourage Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf

states to exert greater efforts to prevent radical elements in their societies from providing funds to Sunni Arab sectarian

organizations in Iraq. They must also prevent their nationals from traveling to Iraq to join insurgent organizations.

26

Saudi

Arabia and the Arab Gulf states have often looked the other way as merchants and supposed philanthropic organizations have

channeled funds to Sunni radical groups in Iraq (much as Iran has followed a similar policy with Shiite militias in southern

Iraq). The United States can also play a positive role in helping Iraq settle its outstanding financial obligations to Kuwait that

stem from its seizure of the country in August of 1990, which subsequently led to the 1991 Gulf War.

CONCLUSION

U.S.-Iraqi relations are highly complex and fraught with danger. As these relations evolve, the United States will need to show

great patience. It will need to emphasize repeatedly that its goals in Iraq are neither to control its extensive hydrocarbon

wealth, nor to dominate the country politically. Rather the main U.S. goal—as should constantly be highlighted—remains

assisting Iraq in achieving the goals of stability, democratization, and economic prosperity that it has set for itself. In this

process, both countries remain tied to the same outcome, a free and democratic Iraq that assumes its role as a force for

positive change in the Middle East.

FPRI, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, PA 19102-3684

For more information, contact Alan Luxenberg at 215-732-3774, ext. 105, email fpri@fpri.org, or visit us at www.fpri.org.

25

“Many Christians Fell Iraq, With Syria the Haven of Choice,” New York Times

, August 5, 2004,

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/05/international/middleeast/05syria.

26

“U.S. Officials Voice Frustrations With Saudis Over Iraq,” The New York Times

, July 27, 2007,

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/27/world/africa/27iht-27saudiweb.

6857553.html?scp=1&sq=us%20voices%20frustration%20with%20saudis&st=cse; This article notes that of the 60-80 fighters

entering Iraq each month to join Sunni Arab insurgent organizations, over half were Saudi.

McNeese State University

In times past, when researching and writing about American Indians, one of the great mistakes made by historians was limiting their research materials to the kinds customarily used by those in the profession.  After thoroughly scouring libraries, archives, and manuscript repositories, historians would use the traditional primary and secondary sources: monographs, diaries, government documents, newspapers, personal papers, etc.  The problem that stemmed from this technique was that Indian people rarely left these kinds of resources.  Historically speaking, tribes lacked written languages and Indian people did not leave written records such as those noted above.  The key ramification of this is that history, as traditionally written, rarely accounted for an Indian perspective.  Historians made little effort to understand Indian motivations or account for cultural or religious differences.  The result portrayed Indian people as one-dimensional, reactionary, unknowable, and intractable.  Since their ways appeared inscrutable, historians focused on the side they could document: the non-Indian side!  No wonder Alphonso Ortiz, a San Juan Tewa Indian and anthropologist, wrote that, AConventional history is so at odds with the facts that Indians often simply ignore it…History is so distorted it is irrelevant.@

The practice or technique of Aethnohistory@ allows the historian to broaden and enrich the writing of Indian history by making use of documentation from other disciplines.  Practitioners make use of anthropology, ethnology, oral traditions, language, archaeology, even things such as music and art, as avenues by which to understand more fully Indian people.  Incorporating these non-traditional

tools into writing history enriches the text by portraying Indians as sentient, multi-dimensional, people whose interactions with Indians and non-Indians can be seen from completely different perspectives.  Thus ethnohistory can help deepen our understanding of history by revealing the Indian side of the story.

Now, let=s look at a practical example of how ethnohistory can change historical interpretations.  The following excerpts all relate a story familiar in the early colonial history of Louisiana.  Note that all three versions have basically the same “facts.”  But in answering the question “why?” the first two simply begin with the assumption that the Natchez Indians were at fault, thus the French were justified in retaliation.  The third excerpt, however, incorporates knowledge of Natchez culture to explain Natchez motives.  Note the differences in tone, verbs and adjectives used, and placement of blame.

Excerpt from Ross Phares, Cavalier in the Wilderness:  The Story of the Explorer and

Trader Louis Juchereau de St. Denis.  Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1952.  pages 195-96.

The governor [Cadillac] summoned Bienville to him and informed him that some Frenchmen had been murdered by the Natchez.  He directed Bienville to take fifteen soldiers and nineteen able-bodied men to punish the Natchez and build a fort in their territory…Bienville was a man of great pride and, despite his many faults, was no coward.  He accepted the governor’s challenge and set out to the Natchez nation to make the best of his assignment.  He built a stockade below the Natchez nation and sent word to the tribesmen that he had come to establish a trading post.  After a time a delegation of the Natchez, including three principal chiefs, called at the fort for a [meeting].  [Bienville] told them that he knew of the murder of the five Frenchmen by their tribesmen.  He had come to demand the delivery of the men who had murdered the Frenchmen.

Excerpt from Jonathan Daniels, The Devil’s Backbone: The Story of the Natchez Trace.  (orig. pub. 1962)  New Orleans: Pelican, 1987.  pages 12-13.

This great sun-bronzed Bienville was one of the nine Le Moyne brothers, whose father in Canada had been ennobled for his services to France…It was in [1715] that Cadillac [Governor of Louisiana] sent Bienville to reduce the Natchez Indians to obedience to the crown of France.  [Bienville] had an aptitude for learning the Indian languages and conciliating the tribesmen.  Still, this time he knew that he had antagonism behind him, watching for any weakness.  So when the Natchez Indians killed four Frenchmen and ransacked a depot of supplies, he retaliated with swift stratagem and severity.  He had only 49 men against the whole Natchez Nation.  Still, undaunted and shrewd as he was brave, he captured by trick the Great Sun of the tribe.  He forced the chief to deliver the leaders of the raid.  They were promptly put to death.

Excerpt from Daniel H. Usner, Jr., Indians, Settlers, & Slaves in a frontier Exchange Economy.  Chapel Hill:  Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1992.  pages 28-29.

In the fall of 1715, Natchez leaders were insulted by Antoine de La Mothe Cadillac, the disreputable founder of Detroit and governor of Louisiana…when on a downriver voyage he refused to stop and smoke their calumet.  Interpreting this negligence as a sign of hostility, a Natchez war party assassinated four traders and pillaged ten thousand livres worth of merchandise from the…company’s local warehouse.  In the following spring Bienville led a small army of thirty-five men upriver to the Indian town of Tunica.  There he negotiated with a group of Natchez leaders, took some of them hostage, and demanded the heads of persons responsible for the deaths.

The final passage makes clear the first offense occurred when the French failed to observe the protocol of the calumet.  This was a grievous diplomatic faux pas that had deadly consequences.   Omitting this cultural fact from the first two passages leaves the reader with the impression that the Natchez just randomly killed the Frenchmen, thereby making the Natchez seem capricious, ignorant, and hostile.  However, including the fact at least provides some rationale for the actions.  The third passage reveals the Natchez are actively defending their honor and Usner=s use of the verb Aassassinated@ when describing their action makes the political / diplomatic motivation apparent.  Indeed, when viewed in this way, the French response of kidnapping and killing of the Natchez now seems capricious and aggressive.

As these passages demonstrate, a reliance on traditional research methods and resources in the writing of history can certainly lead to bias and misunderstanding.  Incorporating ethnohistory techniques can improve our understanding of IndianBnon-Indian relations and give us a more accurate view of our shared past.  The simple example given here is just one chosen from the vast literature on Indian history or history that relates to them.  Imagine the work to be done in rethinking and rewriting our past.  Ethnohistory can be one of the tools we use as we take up the challenge suggested by Ortiz and we strive to make our history relevant.

Historians often have at their disposal in the writing of history a wide of array of source materials.  These sources fall broadly into the categories “primary” and “secondary.”  Once sources are located, the historian must subject them to critical analysis to determine their accuracy and usefulness.

Why must we do this?  British historian Herbert Butterfield (The Whig Interpretation of History) once wrote:

[The historian]…is neither judge nor jury; he is in the position of a man called upon to give evidence; and even so he may abuse his office and he requires the closest cross-examination, for he is one of those >expert witnesses= who persist in offering opinions concealed within their evidence.  Perhaps all history books hold a danger for those who do not know a great deal of history already.  In any case, it is never safe to forget the truth which really underlies historical research: the truth that all history perpetually requires to be corrected by more history….History is all things to all men.  She is at the service of good causes and bad.  In other words she is a harlot and a hireling, and for this reason she best serves those who suspect her most.

To minimize the dangers of such pitfalls, historians, and those who Ado history,@ must subject all evidence to critical analysis.  There are two types of criticism= external and internal.

External criticism is the process of determining the authenticity of the document.  Is it what it is purported to be?  Who is the author?  Can you identify the genre of the document or writing, i.e., is it a diary, private letter, public letter, speech, business letter, government document, etc.?

Internal criticism is the process of determining the value and accuracy of the information contained in the document.  In order to do this, the historian must pose several questions:  What was the author’s intent?  Why was this written?  For whom was it written?  What role did the author have in the event?  Is this hearsay?  If so, how reliable is it?  What sorts of bias might the author have?  Can the factual evidence be corroborated by other sources?

Depending on the answers to the questions posed above, the historian must then determine to what extent the source is actually useful to the research project at hand.  How can this evidence be used?  What questions can be asked of the source in pursuing the topic under consideration?  Can the evidence be used in some creative way to reach conclusions other than those intended by the author?  Does the evidence provide leads that might suggest other lines of inquiry?

A practical exercise in critical analysis:

Many years ago I had the good fortune to engage in a research project that eventually led to my publication of King of the Wildcatters: The Life and Times of Tom Slick, 1883-1930,College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996.  One of the difficult aspects of writing this monograph was that the subject, Tom Slick, left few personal materials upon which to learn anything of his early life.  He was a shy and taciturn man.  Newspapers, oil trade journals, court records, and other sources provided a fair amount of information on his business activities; however, his early life remained largely unknown.  As I conducted research I stumbled across a speech that his son, Tom, Jr., delivered in 1952 at the Cushing Petroleum Festival to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the discovery of the Cushing oil field in northeasternOklahoma.  Slick’s discovery of this field in 1912 was a pivotal moment in his life and career.  The speech was printed as a pamphlet and the copy I found was in the Cushing Public Library.  The full title of the pamphlet is “Some Comments on The Life of Tom Slick, Sr. By His Son.”  The portion of greatest interest for my research related enticing information on Slick’s childhood and adolescent years.

“My father started life as a poor boy back in 1883 in Clarion,Pennsylvania, right in the region where the oil industry was born.  His father [Johnson M. Slick] before him had some connection with the early days of the oil industry as a drilling contractor, but he died in South America when my father was but eleven years old, leaving him as the oldest of three children, and a widowed wife who knew nothing of earning a living.

“My father left school and was able from that age on to support his family by such devices as selling newspapers and stove polish, buying chickens wholesale from the farmers, dressing them and then selling them retail to customers.

“By the time he was eighteen, he went to work as a ‘roustabout’ in the oil fields in West Virginia, and by the time he was twenty, he moved out to the very early days of the oil industry in Oklahoma—having been promoted, by that time, to cable tool dresser.

External criticism:  The document was fairly easy to authenticate from newspaper accounts that contained quotes of some of the same information as related in the speech, plus the document was donated by someone who attended the event.

Internal criticism:  This proved to be far more problematic….Some cursory genealogical information supplied by the family listed Johnson Slick’s death as 1912. This meant that Tom, born in 1883, could not have been eleven years old; instead he was twenty-nine years old.  Also, Tom was the middle child of three, not the oldest.  After obtaining an official copy of Johnson Slick’s death certificate I learned that he died on April 16, 1912 inPittsburgh,PA, not inSouth America.  Interestingly, Tom Slick provided his father’s personal information contained on the death certificate, and he had signed it!

As for the information in the speech about Slick’s early years as a roustabout (common oilfield laborer) and his promotion to cable tool dresser (someone who prepares drilling tools for use in the well), Tom Slick himself gave the most direct refutation.  In 1929, after many years of refusing to provide any personal information to the media, he finally gave an interview to a newspaper reporter.

Excerpt from:  “Why Tom Slick, Who ‘Sold Out’ for 35 Million Dollars in Cash, Cannot Retire From Business” by A.B. MacDonald in the Kansas City Star, May 5, 1929. 

“’The newspapers have printed many things about me,’ said Slick.  ‘They have said that when I was struggling along in the early days I was so poor I was often hungry, and that I was a mule driver and tool dresser and so on.  I was poor enough, God knows, but I was never starving.  I always had sense enough to rustle a meal,’ and he laughed. 

“’I never drove a mule in my life, nor dressed a drill.  I would have done those things if I had had to, but I just didn’t.  I am not ashamed of work.  I’ve done my share of it.  My whole life has been work, work, work, the hardest kind of work, but not manual labor, except six months in an oil supply store in Chanute, Kan., just after I came west from Clarion, Pa., where I was born among the oil derricks….’

 by Dr. Ray Miles, McNeese State University

Critical analysis of the source, therefore, revealed that with these pieces of evidence in direct contradiction to the personal information related in the speech, it could not be used.  As tempting as it may have been to cite its detail about Slick’s youthful entrepreneurial and enterprising spirit, the source was simply too flawed to use. 

In the final analysis, perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the speech is how it could contain information that was so inaccurate.  Did Tom Sr. tell the fanciful story to his son?  In the style of Horatio Alger, did Tom Jr. fabricate the story to make his father seem like a rags-to-riches hero?  The answers to these questions must remain a mystery.

            One of the most daunting challenges facing history teachers is to make students care.  Most kids will do what they need to do to earn a passing grade on a test, or to complete a project.  However, how does one instill an appreciation of the significance of the past?  Often, we are met with skepticism, apathy, or outright rejection when we try to convince young people the study of history holds meaning for them. 

            Part of the problem, I think, is that we expect present-minded children and teenagers to identify with the problems and concerns of people in the past. Often, they simply don’t see how the problems of, let’s say, the American home front in World War II has anything to do with anything that they have experienced.

            There are many ways to combat what I would call historical apathy.  Use of primary sources such as documents and photographs can awaken interest in a historical topic; use of historical fiction and film can also pique young people’s curiosity about the past.  Role-play, cooperative learning, hands-on projects, and field trips are all effective.  The method that I would like to focus on in this short article, however, is the incorporation of the history of children and young people in U.S. history lessons.  Inclusion of content and resources that allow your students to see a historical event through the eyes of young people of that era can do a great deal to awaken your students’ interest. 

            When teaching about the colonial period, for instance, one can include details that help students visualize the world of young people in that era.  What was it like for a child in a city like Philadelphia or Boston? On a tobacco plantation? How did the lives of poor children differ from those of the wealthy, or of free children from slave?   Which young people received an education and what was it like? What kind of music did they listen to? What did they read? What did they do for fun? Even a small amount of time devoted to helping your students realize what life would have likely been like for them can make a huge difference in their interest level and receptiveness to the other content taught in the unit.  See the Colonial Williamsburg Web site for both content and ideas.

When teaching about the U.S. Civil War, incorporate photographs of children caught in the conflict. (You can readily find these on the Library of Congress Web site as well as many Civil War sites.)  It is one thing to talk about the thousands of teenagers who enlisted on both sides of the conflict; it is another thing entirely to look into their eyes through reproductions of daguerreotypes and tintypes. The bravado of a young Confederate recruit in 1861, the eagerness of a young contraband boy posing in a Union camp, or the calm gaze of a Union drummer boy still have the power to speak to students across time.  Firsthand accounts of young prisoners in hell holes such as Andersonville, letters from young soldiers to their parents, and of  young girls who worked as nurses or who fled from the ravages of war bring life and depth to the story of the Civil War. Slave narratives, available on-line through the Library of Congress, give a rich insight into how slavery and emancipation were experienced by children and young people, although recounted for WPA interviewers at a much later date.

One of the richest sources of information about young people in a more recent historical era can be found on the New Deal Network, the educational Web site for the FDR Presidential Library.  When teaching about the New Deal, students’ eyes often begin glaze over as we teach about law after law, agency after agency. However, when presented with letters written by children and teenagers to Eleanor Roosevelt, or to read accounts of what happened to homeless children who “rode the rails,” or to view photographs of Dust Bowl families taken by WPA photographers, both the Depression and the work of the “Alphabet Agencies” take on a greater meaning.  A book such as Studs Terkel’s Hard Times, which is highly readable for high school students, includes many interviews of individuals who were children or teenagers during the Depression.  Of course, 20^th century topics such as the Great Depression, World War II, and the Cold War give teachers opportunities to incorporate local history through oral history interviews.

Although I have only made a few suggestions here, I encourage teachers to explore ways to incorporate your students historical “peers” into your lessons. It is a great way to not only encourage empathy for people in the past, but to help your students develop an understanding of how historical change affects everyone in a society.

In the retinue of best practices in history teaching, use of primary sources ranks high.   Teachers from elementary school on up are expected not just to recount history but to expose students directly to voices, ideas and images from the past.  Yet it is often not clear what students are supposed to derive from this experience.    What should students be looking for in a historical document, and how are they to build from these artifacts an image of the past?

Many students, and probably their teachers as well, when confronted with this challenge would begin by invoking the concept of “bias.”   The first step in using a primary source, our hypothetical learner might explain, would be to determine whether or not it is biased.  If it does turn out to be biased, then of course, it should be used with caution if at all.  At the very least objective sources should be brought in to restore balance and establish the facts.

If bias is seen as a regrettable, though sometimes unavoidable, shortcoming in primary sources, it grows into a mortal sin when found in secondary historical writings.   A biased historical account, conventional wisdom assumes, is a violation of the basic standards of the historical profession.  A biased work is more than just untrustworthy—it is unethical.

Implicit in these notions of bias is an ideal of absolute disinterestedness, total objectivity.  The historian, it is assumed, should approach his or her topic as a kind of alien chronicler, a stranger from another world, with no personal connections, no axes to grind, in relation to the events and processes under investigation.   In the footsteps of the immortal Thucydides, the historian should write history for the ages, eschewing factional entanglements and sticking strictly to the facts “as they actually happened.”

Bolstered by the ideal of pure objectivity, historians can approach their task with a sense of certitude and moral clarity.  But in the heat of the research process, these comfortable assumptions often start to unravel.    Historical investigations, it turns out, neither begin nor end with raw undigested facts.  Throughout the process, data must be assembled, sources accumulated and in the process choices must be made.  Anyone who has worked in an archive is has no doubt experienced the sensation of being overwhelmed with data.   Confronted with a mass of potential sources, the historian is forced to be selective, sifting through the random and repetitive chaff in search of kernels of meaning.   But how is this meaning determined?   On what basis does the historian make choices?  Implicitly or explicitly, historians are guided by questions that set priorities and establish which sources are most relevant. These questions in turn are a reflection of the milieu in which they were formulated.   Whether in response to scholarly debates, social problems, political struggles, personal experience or all combined, historians formulate the questions that guide their research in relation to their world as they experience it.   Historians are not strangers from another planet.  We are drawn to the past because it speaks to the concerns of our own time.

If the present intrudes into historical research it is all the more ubiquitous in the writing process.   Even the driest most descriptive narrative is a product of thousands of subtle choices—which information to include and in what order, when to use direct quotations and when to paraphrase,  what tone to adopt in describing individuals and events, how to account for motives and causality.   All of these choices are informed by the author’s desire to convey a particular vision of a historical episode–not just what occurred, but how and why.    A conscientious historian will take pains to insure that his or her vision is grounded in a close and careful reading of the sources, but the way in which the sources are woven into a narrative reflects the guiding questions and assumptions that a writer brings to the task.

My point, to put it bluntly, is that we are all biased.   We all have a perspective, a point of view that reflects our understanding of past and present.    Our bias may be openly and persuasively expressed, in which case it is usually referred to as an argument, or it may be deeply embedded in a descriptive narrative, but it is never absent.

The universality of bias does not mean, however, that every perspective is equally valid.   Falsification, willful misrepresentation, tendentious selection of sources and shoddy research are not mere figments of the imagination.  It is the historian’s task to identify such transgressions and give them the treatment they deserve.  But even the most discredited text can still stand as a powerful and significant historical source in its own right, to the extent that it reflects the perceptions, motives and interests of its creator.   No one would presume to use the forged manuscripts of Václav Hanka as a reliable source for factual information on medieval Czech history, but they express quite eloquently the spirit of early 19^th century Romantic Nationalism.

Therefore, rather than imparting to our students a view of bias as a kind of scarlet letter marking a text as unsuitable for historical consumption, we should focus instead on cultivating a greater sensitivity to ideas and contexts.  An aspiring historian should learn to listen for the author’s perspective, tease out the assertions and assumptions hidden in the narrative, place these ideas in the context of contemporaneous movements, debates and trends, and determine on the basis of this close critical reading how the text is best used as a historical source.   Individual perspective (call it bias if you will) is nothing to fear—in fact it is often a historian’s greatest asset.   Give up the holy grail of omniscient objectivity and embrace the view from the ground up.

Nathaniel Knight
Seton Hall University

Additional Readings:

E. H. Carr, What is History? New York: Vintage, 1961.

John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past. New York:  Oxford University Press, 2002

Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.